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Abstract 
 
 
In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a 
unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show 
that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is 
reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the 
unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend 
on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does 
not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the 
employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit 
budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process. 
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1 Introduction
A common feature of most developed countries is the provision of unemployment benets for those who eventu-
ally become unemployed. We can distinguish two alternative unemployment benet systems depending on how
such benets are settled. On the one hand, we have the Beveridgean system, where the unemployment benets
are a xed amount. This system is present at Australia, United Kingdom, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand or
Poland. On the other hand, we have the Bismarckian system, where the unemployment benets are settled as a
proportion of a previous earnings base. This system is present at Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden or the United States, among others, if the earnings base is the gross wage, and in Austria or
Germany if the earnings base is the net wage.1 At the same time, in the Beveridgean countries usually there
are no specic taxes to nance the unemployment benets, whereas the Bismarckian countries usually make use
of a wage tax levied on workers and a payroll tax levied on rms. Moreover, each country has a di¤erent labor
tax composition2 and a di¤erent unemployment rate. In this paper we analyze how this labor tax composition
a¤ects the unemployment rate in an unionized economy with capital accumulation.
We rst begin analyzing the most common system: the Bismarckian unemployment benet system with
benets based on gross earnings or gross Bismarckian system. Such system is nanced exclusively through both
a wage and a payroll tax. Since the government uses a budget-balanced rule, then it has to choose between
setting the benet side or the tax side of the system when deciding the unemployment benet system.3 When
there exists a government budget-balanced rule then indeterminacy may arise, as Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(1997) show in a real business cycle competitive economy. More specically, Guo and Harrison (2004)4 conclude
that if government spendings are nanced through xed tax rates (and hence government spendings become
endogenous) then indeterminacy is impossible, whereas if any tax (or all of them) is endogenous (and hence
government spendings become exogenous) then indeterminacy is possible in the sense that multiple self-fullling
equilibria may arise. Moreover, we do not know ex-ante the particular equilibrium the economy is converging to.
Even though we have a non competitive labor market, intuition suggests that requiring a government budget-
balanced rule would induce the same type of results. In fact, when both the payroll and the wage tax are
xed by the government and the (gross) replacement ratio5 is endogenous (in order to balance the government
budget constraint), then the economy converges to an unique equilibrium. However, in the opposite case, when
the replacement ratio is xed and both the payroll and the wage tax are endogenous, then a continuum of self-
fullling equilibria arise. Instead, if the replacement ratio and one of the two taxes are xed, then the possibility
of having a continuum of self-fullling equilibria dissapears, but the possibility of having indeterminacy remains
unaltered. In particular, if the wage tax is the endogenous scal instrument then two self-fullling equilibria
arise, whereas if the payroll tax is the endogenous scal instrument then indeterminacy does not hold and we
have only one equilibrium. Therefore, the tax government choice may cause indeterminacy, and two economies
with the same replacement ratio may exhibit a di¤erent unemployment rate because of a di¤erent labor tax
composition. Note that indeterminacy can be avoided just by selecting the payroll tax as the unique instrument
to balance the budget. These results are in contrast with Koskela and Vilmunen (1996), Goerke (2000), Egger
(2002), Goerke and Madsen (2003) or Beissinger and Egger (2004).
When the wage tax is endogenous, then two di¤erent steady state equilibria arise. Expectations are crucial:
if agents believe that the wage tax will be high, then their wage demand increases. Firms respond with a low
1The institutional details of the unemployment benet system for the di¤erent countries can be found in OECD (2004).
2For instance, the wage and payroll taxes were 2.8% and 4%, respectively, in France in 1998, and 1.6% and 6.7%, respectively,
in Spain in 2003.
3There exists some confusion in some papers between a budget-balanced and a revenue neutral rule when the unemployment
benet system is analyzed. Since we consider a self-nanced program, tax revenues are required in order to (exactly) compensate
the unemployment benet spendings. Hence, the reasonable assumption should be to require a budget-balanced rule.
4Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) suggest the same results, too.
5The replacement ratio is the proportion of the wage earned when working that is paid to the unemployed.
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labor demand and, then, unemployment rises. Thus, a wage demand spillover is created and the unemployment
becomes high. Since the government nancial necessities rise, the wage tax increases, which implies a reduction
of savings and, thus, the economy converges to an equilibrium with low capital and high unemployment. In
contrast, if individuals expect a low wage tax rate, then their wage demand is low, too. Since rms respond
with a high labor demand, then the unemployment and the wage tax remain at a low rate. Thus, two di¤erent
equilibria are possible, one with a high level of employment (namely, optimistic equilibrium) and the other with
a high level of unemployment (namely, pessimistic equilibrium).
We show that the unemployment rate of the economy is crucially determined by the ratio between the net
wage received by the worker and the wage paid by rms (namely, tax wedge), as in Goerke (2000). When
both taxes are exogenous and the government adjusts the replacement ratio in order to satisfy the budget-
balanced rule, then an increase in the payroll tax accompanied by a decrease in the wage tax such that the tax
burden remains constant causes the unemployment rate to fall. In this case, both the replacement ratio and the
net wage that workers receive increases. Therefore, under a xed tax burden unemployment is minimized by
charging the total burden on rms. When the payroll tax is endogenous, a reduction in the wage tax reduces
the unemployment of the economy. Likewise, when the wage tax is endogenous and the economy exhibits two
equilibria, we have that in the optimistic equilibrium an increase in the payroll tax implies both a lower wage
tax and a lower unemployment rate. In the pessimistic equilibrium, and surprisingly, a reduction of the payroll
tax induces a low wage tax. Hence, in this equilibrium both taxes can be reduced at the same time that the
unemployment rate decreases. Therefore, we have that in the gross Bismarkian unemployment benet system
the lower the wage tax is, the lower the unemployment rate is. The rationale when the replacement ratio is
exogenous is that a lower wage tax implies a lower wage demand, which a¤ect negatively the unemployment
benets and, thus, government nancial necessities. Hence, since the tax base is the same, the increase in the
payroll tax in order to satisfy the budget-balanced rule may be smaller than the reduction in the wage tax.
In the Bismarckian unemployment benet system with benets based on net earnings or net Bismarckian
system, we nd that there exists only one equilibrium. Moreover, the unemployment rate does not depend on
how the unemployment benet system is nanced. Hence, the equilibrium is consistent with di¤erent labor tax
combinations. Unemployment is exclusively explained by the technology, the unionsbargaining power and the
replacement ratio.
A common characteristic of the countries with the Beveridgean unemployment benet system is that there
are no specic taxes to nance the unemployment benets. However, most of the papers considering constant
unemployment benets introduce specic taxes to nance them. We discuss this alternative in a general frame-
work where we assume an income tax for the unemployed, a payroll tax, a wage tax and a tax exemption for
the workers. This allows to analyze the following cases: unemployed do not pay taxes and employed pay the
same marginal tax rate for all their income; employed have two tax brackets: they pay the same marginal tax
rate than unemployed for the same income but they pay a higher marginal tax rate for the rest of the income;
both unemployed and employed pay a di¤erent marginal tax rate for all their respective income; all individuals
pay the same marginal tax rate for all their income; unemployed do not pay taxes and employed have a scal
exemption, as in Koskela and Vilmunen (1996). We consider the case where the instrument used to adjust the
government budget is the payroll tax. In contrast with the gross Bismarckian system, now we have two steady
state employment rates. We show that, as in the net Bismarckian system, the labor tax composition does not
a¤ect the unemployment rates of the economy if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed
pay a constant marginal tax rate. Otherwise, an increase in the wage tax always makes the unemployment rate
to decrease in the optimistic equilibrium and to increase in the pessimistic equilibrium. Therefore, it is the same
having two tax brackets than having an exemption. Moreover, we have that a more progressive scal system
(an increase in the tax exemption) yields a lower unemployment rate. This result coincides with Koskela and
Vilmunen (1996) but, in contrast with them, here the result is due to an endogenous increase of the payroll tax
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and not of the wage tax. Besides, an increase in the tax exemption makes the payroll tax to increase whereas
an increase in the wage tax makes the payroll tax to decrease, but in both cases the unemployment decreases.
Since in some countries the gross Bismarckian system has both a minimum and a maximum benet, we
analyze a mixed benet system with a xed and a variable part. We show that when the payroll tax is exogenous
then two steady state equilibria arise. Moreover, unemployment is reduced in the optimistic equilibrium and
increased in the pessimistic equilibrium if there is a shift of the tax incidence from wage taxes to payroll taxes.
The main di¤erence with respect to the gross Bismarckian system is that now the pessimistic equilibria may be
unstable.
The negotiation between unions and rms is a right-to-manage one, where unions focus on both wage and
employment but bargain only on wages. We show that the qualitative results remain unchanged either in a
seigniorage model or if unions focus and bargain on both wages and employment. Thus, we obtain the same
result as Creedy and McDonald (1991), who show that the qualitative e¤ects of taxes on employment do not
depend on the type of negotiation, but a di¤erent one to Cardona and Sánchez-Losada (2006), who analyze a
segmented labor market.
Other studies have centered on other aspects of the unemployment benet system. Fredriksson and Holmlund
(2001) analyze a system with both unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance, Albrecht and Vroman
(1999) analyze the experience rating, Picard (2001) centers on both the job additionality and the unemployment
trap in the sense that individuals loose their entitlement to unemployment and welfare when they choose to
work, and Corneo and Marquardt (2000) analyze the interaction between the Beveridgean unemployment benet
system, an unfunded public pensions program, and economic growth. From an empirical point of view, the
literature has centered on the e¤ects of the labor taxes on the unemployment rate. Layard and Nickell (1986),
Nickell and Layard (1999) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000) show that the rise in the labor tax wedge plays
an important role in raising the wage pressure and hence the unemployment rate. However, Lockwood and
Manning (1993) for the U.K. case and Holm, Honkapohja and Koskela (1994) for the Finnish case show that
the tax wedge is not a good measure and, hence, the e¤ects of either a wage tax or a payroll tax may be
di¤erent, since the tax base of each tax may be di¤erent. Among these papers, only Holm et al. (1994) include
in the analysis the spending counterpart that the government makes of the collected taxes (in this case the
unemployment benets). None of them analyzes the case where the wage tax increases and the payroll tax
decreases, or vice versa.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the framework economy. In section 3 we
analyze the gross Bismarckian unemployment benet system. In section 4 we discuss alternative unemployment
benet systems and bargaining patterns. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The economy
We construct a very simple economy with constant population, whose mass is normalized to one. Individuals
are endowed with one unit of labor which they o¤er inelastically at each period t.
Individuals. We assume Solow individuals: each one saves a constant fraction of her income. Therefore,
savings for the individual i are
sit = s  Iit; (1)
where sit are individual savings, Iit is the individual income, and s 2 (0; 1) is the constant propension to save.6
6We obtain the same savings using a Cobb-Douglas utility function and an overlapping generations economy à la Diamond. If
instead we assume an innite horizon economy, we would recover the same savings only in steady state.
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Firms. There is a continuum of rms, each producing according to a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas
technology given by
Yt = AK
1 
t L

t (2)
where Kt is capital, Lt is labor, and  2 (0; 1). We assume capital depreciates in one period.
Unemployment benet system: Unemployment benets may consist of a xed part, bt  0; and a
variable part which is assumed to be a function of the past wage wt 1, i.e. bt + f (wt 1). If bt = 0 and
f (wt 1) = twt 1; where t 2 (0; 1) is usually known as the benet replacement ratio, we have the gross
Bismarckian unemployment benet system. This system is the most common in the OECD countries, and
it is nanced by workers and rms through proportional taxes on wages (wage tax  t and payroll tax  t,
respectively). If f (wt 1) = 0; we have the Beverigdean unemployment benet system, which is common in
some Anglo-Saxon countries, where unemployment benets are considered as a redistributive issue and, usually,
there are no specic taxes to nance the unemployment program.
In this section, we focus on a self-nanced Bismarckian unemployment benet system based on gross earnings.
Even though unemployment benets are a proportion of the wage received by the worker when employed, in
order to make the analysis more tractable we consider that such benets are related to the average wage of the
economy wt, as in Layard and Nickell (1990), Manning (1993) or Altenburg and Straub (1998).7 Accordingly,
and since all rms are simmetric, the government budget constraint is given by
wtLt( t +  t) = (1  Lt)twt. (3)
Note that the employment and the unemployment rates are Lt and (1  Lt) ; respectively. An important aspect
of this budget-balanced rule is that revenues are also endogenous. Hence, and in contrast with many models
that only consider revenue-neutral rules, nancial necessities may vary when unemployment changes.
Union bargaining: We consider the right-to-manage bargaining. This bargaining takes place at a de-
centralized level, so that neither rms nor unions perceive the e¤ects of their actions on the economy via the
government budget constraint. The timing of the bargaining is as follows: once the rms have selected the level
of capital, rms and unions bargain over wages. After, rms choose the employment level. Hence, given wt and
Kt, the employment level chosen by any rm solves
max
Lt

AK1 t L

t   wtLt(1 +  t)  (1 + rt)Kt

;
from where we have
(1 +  t)wt = AK
1 
t L
 1
t . (4)
The objective function of the union in the bargaining process is given by the net wage mass, while the rms
objective are prots.8 The disagreement point of the union is given by wt while the rms fall-back position
is  (1 + rt)Kt; since at this point its level of capital has been already selected. Thus, according to the Nash
solution and denoting the bargaining power of the union and the rm by  and (1  ) ; respectively, with
 2 [0; 1] ; the wage solves
max
wt
[(wt(1   t)  wt)Lt]

AK1 t L

t   wtLt(1 +  t)
1 
7Beissinger and Egger (2004) consider that unions are aware on the possibility that current employed could be red in the next
period and, therefore, unions realize that the bargained wage of today a¤ects the unemployment benets of tomorrow. However,
they disregard that rms should also realize that the bargained wage of today a¤ects the bargained wage of tomorrow. Nonetheless,
if unions only worry about the current wage of the workers of the rm, as in Oswald (1993), then the steady state equilibria would
remain unaltered.
8 It is worth to note that the results do not depend on this specication of the unions objective function. Eliminating employment
from this function would not a¤ect the qualitative results. Moreover, and as we show in section 4, the results are also maintained
when ms and unions bargain over both employment and wages.
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subject to the labor demand given by equation (4). The optimal wage is implicitly dened by
wt(1   t) = Qwt; (5)
where Q = [ +  (1  )] = is greater than 1. Since the rm anticipates both the level of employment and the
wage, it chooses the level of capital that solves
max
Kt

AK1 t L

t   wtLt(1 +  t)  (1 + rt)Kt

subject to equations (4) and (5). Solving the problem yields the capital demand.9
Since all rms are symmetric, and following Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991), in equilibrium the dis-
agreement point is given by
wt = Ltwt (1   t) + (1  Lt) twt; (6)
where the rst part is the probability of nding a job elsewhere times the net wage and the second part is the
probability of being unemployed times the unemployment benets.
3 Payroll or wage taxes?
When there exists a government budget-balanced rule in the economy then indeterminacy may arise. We begin
the analysis in a static framework. We after show that in a dynamic economy where capital accumulation is
considered, the main conclusions concerning both indeterminacy and unemployment remain unchanged.
3.1 The static framework: short-run equilibria
In a static framework, the rmscapital remains constant. First, we analyze the indeterminacy problem. Since
all rms are symmetric, the government budget constraint (3) can be written as
Lt =
t
 t +  t + t
. (7)
Using equations (5) and (6) yields
Lt =
1   t  Qt
Q [1   t   t]
: (8)
And, then, from equations (7) and (8) we have that any pair ( t;  t) satisfying
1   t  Qt
Q [1   t   t]
=
t
 t +  t + t
(9)
constitutes an equilibrium, which shows that multiple self-fullling equilibria may arise. Moreover, combining
equations (7) and (8) yields the employment as a function of both taxes,
Lt =
1   t
1 +  t
Q 1. (10)
Hence, the tax wedge determines the employment level of the economy.10 Figure 1 ilustrates this statement. In
particular, the left hand side represents equation (9) and the right hand side relates the obtained taxes from
equation (9) to the employment level using equation (10).11
9Since s is xed, we do not need the interest rate in order to nd the equilibria.
10Usually, it is called tax wedge to the ratio between the net wage received by the worker and the wage paid by the rm, i.e.
(1   t) = (1 +  t) :
11The chosen values of...
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Figure 1. Relationship between taxes and unemployment
Equations (7)-(10) inform us about the number of equilibria. Indeed, from equation (10) we have that
when government spendings are nanced through xed tax rates (and hence the replacement ratio becomes
endogenous), then there exists only one equilibrium. However, when the replacement ratio is xed and both
the payroll and the wage tax are endogenous, then equation (9) shows that there exists a continuum of pairs
( t;  t) compatible with the equilibrium. And since a continuum of tax pairs implies a continuum of di¤erent
tax wedges, then a continuum of equilibria arise. This is not the case when the replacement ratio and one of
the two taxes are xed. When the wage tax is xed (and hence the payroll tax becomes endogenous), it turns
out from equation (8) that for any  t the economy reaches a unique equilibrium. But when the payroll tax is
xed (and hence the wage tax becomes endogenous), then from equation (7) we have that
 t =
t   ( t + t)Lt
Lt
: (11)
And substituting for  t from equation (11) into equation (8) we implicitly get the employment rate as
Q (1 +  t)L
2
t   (1 +  t + t)Lt + t = 0; (12)
from where we obtain
Lt =
(1 +  t + t)
h
(1 +  t + t)
2   4tQ (1 +  t)
i1=2
2Q (1 +  t)
: (13)
Hence, two di¤erent (generically) and consistent with the same payroll tax equilibria arise.12 Note that the
government can x a specic replacement ratio and avoid indeterminacy by xing the wage tax and adjusting
the payroll tax to balance the unemployment benets budget constraint.
Proposition 1 When the payroll tax is xed and the wage tax is endogenously determined by the government
budget-balanced rule, then two unemployment rate equilibria arise. However, there exists a unique equilibrium
when the wage tax is xed and the payroll tax is endogenous.
Expectations cause the same xed payroll tax to be compatible with two di¤erent equilibria, one with a
low and the other with a high unemployment rate. When unions expect a low unemployment rate, then they
also expect a low wage tax. And, thus, they can reduce their wage demand at the same time that the net
wage increases, what makes unemployment to stay low. Hence, low wage taxes are consistent with a low
unemployment rate. We refer to this equilibrium as the optimistic equilibrium. However, when unions expect
12For an equilibrium to exist (1 +  t + t)
2  4tQ (1 +  t) has to be imposed. Moreover, when (1 +  t + t)2 = 4tQ (1 +  t),
a unique equilibrium is attained.
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a high unemployment rate, then they also expect a high wage tax. Therefore, and in view of a low net wage, their
wage demand increases, what makes unemployment to increase. Hence, high wage taxes are consistent with a
high unemployment rate. We refer to this equilibrium as the pessimistic equilibrium. Moreover, since in the
short-run capital per rm is constant, from the right-to-manage condition we can observe that the gross (net)
wage paid by rms in the pessimistic equilibrium is higher (lower) than that of the optimistic one. Therefore,
the unemployment benets are also higher in the pessimistic equilibrium.
We show next how taxes have to be set in order to minimize the unemployment rate.
Proposition 2 A decrease in the wage tax reduces the unemployment rate of the economy.
P roof. When the replacement ratio is exogenous, it is obvious from equation (10) that a decrease in
the wage tax makes the tax wedge to increase and, hence, unemployment decreases. Therefore, the in-
teresting case is that where a decrease in the wage tax is accompanied by an increase in the payroll tax
such that the tax burden (i.e. the sum of taxes) remains constant. Di¤erentiating equation (10) we have
dLt = [  (1 +  t) d t   (1   t) d t]Q 1= (1 +  t)2 ; and applying d t =  d t we obtain dLt=d t =
( t +  t)Q
 1= (1 +  t)
2
> 0: When the wage tax is exogenous, it is direct to show from equation (8) that
dLt
d t
=
t (1 Q)
Q [1   t   t]2
< 0; (14)
since Q > 1: Thus, a decrease in the wage tax implies an increase in the employment rate. When the payroll
tax is exogenous, from equation (12) we have
dLt
d t
=   Lt (QLt   1)
2Q (1 +  t)Lt   (1 +  t + t)
=
Ltt (Q  1) = (1   t   t)

h
(1 +  t + t)
2   4tQ (1 +  t)
i1=2 ; (15)
where we have used equation (8) in the numerator and equation (13) in the denominator. Thus, in the optimistic
equilibrium we have that dLt=d t > 0; which implies from equation (14) that the wage tax implicitly decreases.
And in the pessimistic equilibrium we have that dLt=d t < 0 and, hence, the wage tax implicitly increases.
Thus, a decrease in the payroll tax implies an increase in the employment rate and a decrease in the wage tax.
Note that this result always holds regardless of the scal instrument that the government uses in order
to balance the unemployment benet budget constraint. Then, given a replacement ratio, unemployment is
minimized if unemployment benets are paid exclusively by rms. When the payroll tax is exogenous, the
reduction in the wage tax is induced by an increase in the payroll tax in the optimistic equilibrium. However,
in the pessimistic equilibrium the wage tax decreases as far as the payroll tax is reduced, too. In both cases
the unemployment rate decreases. A reduction of the wage tax decreases the gross wage paid by rms and
increases the net wage received by the employees in both equilibria, while unemployment benets are reduced
in the optimistic equilibrium and it depends on the specic values of the parameters in the pessimistic one.
3.2 The dynamics: long-run equilibria
Next, we analyze how the introduction of capital accumulation modies the conclusions obtained from the
static model. In fact, similar results are obtained, but in the dynamic setup low unemployment rates imply
high capital stocks, which at the same time reinforce employment.
The introduction of capital implies the existence of a capital market clearing condition: the amount saved
at each period t equals the stock of physical capital at t+ 1, i.e.,
Kt+1 =
Z 1
0
sitdi = s
Z 1
0
Iitdi = sF (Kt; Lt) = sAK
1 
t L

t ; (16)
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from where we can isolate the unemployment level,
Lt =

Kt+1
sAK1 t
 1

: (17)
Note that this equation informs us that in steady state the capital-labor proportion K=L is xed regardless of
the unemployment benet system. But contrary, the capital per capita could be a¤ected by the unemployment
benet system.
Using the government budget constraint (3) and the denition of the disagreement point (6), we get
wt = wtLt(1 +  t); (18)
which combined with equations (5) and (17) yields
(1   t) = Q (1 +  t)

Kt+1
sAK1 t
 1

: (19)
And, from equations (3), (4) and (17) we have
K
1

t+1( t +  t) = (sA)
1
 t
"
1 

Kt+1
sAK1 t
 1

#
K
1 

t . (20)
Equations (19) and (20) recover the dynamics of the economy.
As in the static case, and as we can observe from equation (19), when government spendings are nanced
through xed tax rates and hence the replacement ratio is endogenous, then there exists only one steady
state equilibrium. However, when the replacement ratio is xed and both the payroll and the wage tax are
endogenous, then there exists a continuum of steady state equilibria with a di¤erent capital stock and thus a
di¤erent unemployment rate. Instead, when the replacement ratio and the payroll tax are xed, and hence the
wage tax adjusts to balance the unemployment benet budget constraint, then substituting for  t from equation
(19) into equation (20) yields the capital dynamics as
(1 +  t + t)K
1

t+1  Q (sA) 
1
 K
 1

t K
2

t+1 (1 +  t)  (sA)
1
 tK
1 

t = 0; (21)
from where we have two positive steady state equilibria13 implicitly dened by
Q (sA)
  1 K2 (1 +  )  (1 +  + )K + (sA) 1  = 0: (22)
Solving this equation yields
K =
(sA)
1

2Q (1 +  )

(1 +  + )
h
(1 +  + )
2   4Q (1 +  )
i1=2
: (23)
Hence, there are two steady state equilibria with a di¤erent capital level, one pessimistic K1 and the other
optimistic K2, with K1 < K2. Since from equation (17) in steady state the capital-labor proportion K=L is
xed, then the higher the capital is, the higher the employment rate is. Moreover, di¤erentiating equation (21),
evaluating the resulting expression in steady state, and using equation (22) we have
dKt+1
dKt

Kt+1=Kt
= 1  ; (24)
which indicates that both steady state equilibria are stable without cycles. Next proposition summarizes these
results.
13We do not consider the zero capital equilibrium.
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Proposition 3 When the wage tax is used to balance the unemployment benet budget constraint, then two
stable without cycles steady state equilibria arise.
Although we observe from equations (4) and (17) that in any steady state the gross wage paid by the rm
is constant, labor demand is not. It depends on the capital level of the economy. And this capital level may
di¤er depending on the agentsexpectations about wage taxes. Hence, given a payroll tax rate, the equilibrium
negotiated wage is the same in both equilibria, which implies that whereas the unemployment benets are the
same in both equilibria, the net wage is high in the optimistic equilibrium and low in the pessimistic equilibrium.
When the replacement ratio and the wage tax are xed, and hence the payroll tax adjusts to balance the
unemployment benet budget constraint, then substituting for  t from equation (19) into equation (20) yields
the capital dynamics as
(1   t   t)K
1

t+1  

(1   t)Q 1   t

(sA)
1
 K
1 

t = 0, (25)
from where we have a unique steady state equilibrium,
K =
(1    Q) (sA) 1
Q (1     ) . (26)
Di¤erentiating equation (25), evaluating the resulting expression in steady state, and using equation (26) we
have
dKt+1
dKt

Kt+1=Kt
= 1  ; (27)
which indicates that the steady state equilibrium is stable without cycles. Next proposition summarizes these
results.
Proposition 4 When the payroll tax is used to balance the unemployment benet budget constraint, then there
exists a unique stable without cycles steady state equilibrium.
In this economy, the steady state capital-labor proportion is xed regardless of the unemployment benet
system, which implies a constant gross wage paid by rms. This is a crucial di¤erence with respect to the static
model. In this dynamic setup, the capital adjusts in order to maintain the labor productivity in the long-run.
Hence, if employment is a¤ected by the scal policy, the capital per capita is also a¤ected accordingly. In fact,
the e¤ects on employment from a change of the labor taxes are identical to those in the static model. Thus, a
reduction of the wage tax has an unambiguous positive e¤ect on employment regardless of the two scenarios we
consider: either an exogenous or an endogenous wage tax. Obviously, the evolution of wages can be di¤erent
since the steady state gross wage paid by rms remains constant. Next, we state and prove this result.
Proposition 5 A decrease in the wage tax reduces the unemployment rate of the economy.
P roof. From the proof of Proposition 2 we have that when the replacement ratio is exogenous then a decrease
in the wage tax accompanied by an increase in the payroll tax such that the tax burden remains constant implies
a decrease in the unemployment rate. When the wage tax is exogenous, it is direct to show from equation (26)
that
dK
d
=
(sA)
1
  (1 Q)
Q [1     ]2 < 0: (28)
When the payroll tax is exogenous, from equations (19) and (23) evaluated in steady state we obtain
1   =

(1 +  + )
h
(1 +  + )
2   4Q (1 +  )
i1=2
2
; (29)
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from where we have
d
d 
=  1
2
0B@1 (1 +  + )  2Qh
(1 +  + )
2   4Q (1 +  )
i1=2
1CA : (30)
Noting that the expression into the brackets is positive (negative) ifh
(1 +  + )
2   4Q (1 +  )
i1=2
> (<) [(1 +  + )  2Q] ; (31)
we directly have that in the optimistic equilibrium d=d < 0; and direct calculations show that in the pessimistic
equilibrium d=d > 0: Di¤erentiating equation (23) gives
2Q (1 +  )
(sA)
1

dK
d 
=
0B@1 (1 +  + )  2Qh
(1 +  + )
2   4Q (1 +  )
i1=2
1CA 

(1 +  + )
h
(1 +  + )
2   4Q (1 +  )
i1=2
(1 +  )
:
(32)
As we have shown, in the pessimistic equilibrium the rst bracket on the right hand side is negative. Therefore,
we have that dK=d < 0 and, hence, the wage tax implicitly increases. Thus, a decrease in the payroll tax
implies an increase in the capital level (and thus in the employment rate) and a decrease in the wage tax. In
the optimistic equilibrium, direct calculations show that the right hand side is positive. Hence, we have that
dK=d > 0; which implies that the wage tax implicitly decreases.
The introduction of capital does not change the results. Then, unemployment is minimized if unemployment
benets are paid exclusively by rms. A reduction in the wage tax is consistent with either an increase or a
decrease in the payroll tax. Hence, the evolution of the wage earnings depends on the specic equilibrium the
economy is converging to. In the pessimistic equilibria, characterized by a high wage tax , a decrease in the
payroll tax implies a reduction in the wage tax, which makes the wage to increase and, thus, both the net
wage and the unemployment benets also increase. However, in the optimistic equilibria wages are reduced
from restructuring taxes from workers to rms. Hence, unemployment benets are reduced while net earnings
increase and, then, there are more workers with higher net earnings and less unemployed with lower benets.14
4 Alternative unemployment benet systems and bargaining pat-
terns
In this section, we consider alternative unemployment benet systems. First, we analyze situations where
unemployment benets are tied to net earnings. We show that a budget balanced rule induces a unique steady
state unemployment rate which is independent of the labor tax composition. Second, we analyze situations
where both income and payroll taxes are used to nance the system. This new framework allow us to consider
Beveridge systems where there are no specic taxes to nance unemployment spending. Finally, we analyze
alternative bargaining patterns.
14A reduction of unemployment increases inequality. However, previously unemployed agents become employed and get higher
earnings. Hence, a welfare analysis should contemplate also such shift from unemployment to employment.
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4.1 Net Bismarckian system
The net Bismarckian system is characterized by unemployment benets being a proportion of the net wage.15
In this case, the budget balanced rule is given by
wtLt( t +  t) = (1  Lt)twt(1   t): (33)
In equilibrium, the disagreement point of the unions becomes
wt = wtLt (1   t) + (1  Lt) twt (1   t) . (34)
And combining it with equation (5), we obtain
Lt =
Q 1   t
1  t
. (35)
Hence, there exists an unique equilibrium, which is independent on how spending is nanced. Unemployment
is exclusively explained by the technology, the unionsbargaining power and the replacement ratio. Moreover,
combining equations (33) and (35) we get
 t = t (1   t)

Q  1
1 Qt

   t; (36)
which shows that the equilibrium is consistent with di¤erent labor tax combinations.
Proposition 6 In a net bismarckian unemployment benet system, the labor tax composition does not a¤ect
the unique unemployment rate of the economy.
4.2 Beveridgean system
Unemployment benets are xed in a Beveridgean system. Even though in most countries where this unem-
ployment benet system prevails there are no specic taxes to nance it, the government needs to have a similar
budget balanced rule as in the previous sections. In general, we assume that the unemployment benets b are
taxed at a di¤erent rate b t than wages.16 For simplicity, we x b t =  t with  2 [0; 1]. In order to compare
with other authors, we assume that the worker net wage is
wt    t (wt   ab)  abb t = wt    t [wt   ab (1  v)] ; (37)
where a  0 is an arbitrary constant. This case generalizes the analysis. Indeed, if a = v = 0 we have the
typical system where unemployed do not pay taxes and employed pay the same marginal tax rate for all their
income17 ; if a = 1 then we have the typical income tax where employed have two tax brackets: they pay the
same marginal tax rate than unemployed for the same income but they pay a higher marginal tax rate for the
rest of the income; if a = 0 and v 6= 0 then both unemployed and employed pay a di¤erent marginal tax rate
for all their respective income; if v = 1 then all individuals pay the same marginal tax rate for all their income;
and if v = 0 and 0 < a 6= 1 then employed have a scal exemption (namely, a0 = ab): This last case coincides
with Koskela and Vilmunen (1996).
15Note that in this setup a high wage tax would imply a low unemployment subsidy. Altough this could seem unreasonable, it
prevails in countries as Austria or Germany according to the OECD (2004).
16 It would be more appropiate to refer these taxes as income taxes.
17We say income to the labor income.
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Now, equation (5) is given by
wt(1   t) +Qab (1  v)  t = Qwt; (38)
The budget-balanced rule is given by
wtLt t + Lt t [wt   abt (1  v)] = b (1  Lt) (1  v t) : (39)
The disagreement point in this case can be written as
wt = Lt (wt    t [wt   ab (1  v)]) + b (1  Lt) (1  v t) . (40)
From equations (39) and (40) we have
wt = Ltwt (1 +  t) : (41)
And from equations (38), (41) and (4) we get
AK1 t L
 1
t
(1   t)
(1 +  t)
+Qab (1  v)  t = QAK1 t Lt : (42)
Combining equations (39) and (4) we obtain
AK1 t L

t = AK
1 
t L

t
(1   t)
(1 +  t)
+ abLt t (1  v) + b (1  Lt) (1  v t) . (43)
Equations (42) and (43) yield the employment equilibria of the economy.
We consider the case where the instrument used to adjust the government budget is the payroll tax. Sub-
stituting the payroll tax from (42) into (43), and evaluating in steady state, gives
AK1 L+1Q  AK1 L + b (1  L) (1  ) + abL (1  v) Qab (1  v) L = 0; (44)
which can be written as
G (L; ) = A (K=L)
1 
QL2  
h
A (K=L)
1 
+ (Q  1) ab (1  v) + b (1  )
i
L+ b (1  ) = 0: (45)
Since from equation (17) we have thatK=L is constant in steady state, and in contrast with the gross Bismarckian
system, equation (45) yields (generically) two steady state employment rates, one pessimistic L1 and the other
optimistic L2, with L1 < L2. Moreover, since equation (45) is quadratic, we have
@G (L1; )
@L
< 0 and
@G (L2; )
@L
> 0: (46)
Di¤erentiating equation (45) yields
@L
@
=
(1  L) b + (Q  1) ab (1  v)L
@G (L; ) =@L
; (47)
and, hence, we get
@L
@

L=L1
 0 and @L
@

L=L2
 0. (48)
Except in the case that a = v = 0; an increase in the wage tax always reduces (increases) the steady state
unemployment rate of the economy in the optimistic (pessimistic) case. Therefore, it is the same having two tax
brackets (a = 1) than having an exemption (v = 0 and 0 < a 6= 1). Moreover, we have that a more progressive
scal system (an increase in the tax exemption) yields a lower unemployment rate in the optimistic equilibrium.
This result coincides with Koskela and Vilmunen (1996) but, in contrast with them, here the result is due to an
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endogenous increase of the payroll tax and not of the wage tax. Note that an increase in a makes the payroll
tax to increase whereas an increase in  makes the payroll tax to decrease, but in both cases the unemployment
decreases. When unemployed do not pay taxes and employed pay the same marginal tax rate for all their
income, a = v = 0; then @L=@ = 0; which coincides with the net Bismarckian system. In the Appendix we
show, as a subcase of the mixed unemployment benet system, that for this case the optimistic equilibrium is
always stable whereas the pessimistic equilibrium may now be unstable.
Proposition 7 In a Beveridgean unemployment benet system, the labor tax composition does not a¤ect the
unemployment rates of the economy if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a
constant marginal tax rate. Otherwise, a decrease in the wage tax makes the unemployment rate to decrease in
the optimistic equilibrium and to increase in the pessimistic equilibrium.
4.3 Mixed unemployment benet system
Given the assumptions that marginal taxes are constant and exclusively levied on workers and rms, the
implications of a change in the labor tax composition have been shown to di¤er under a gross Bismarckian or
a Beveridgean system. At this point, a reasonable extension is to ask about the e¤ects of a change in the labor
tax composition when the unemployment benets consist of both a xed part b and a variable part w. Since
when unemployed do not pay taxes then labor tax composition does not a¤ect employment in a Beveridgean
system, intuition suggests that the positive e¤ect on employment of a reduction in the wage tax under a gross
Bismarckian system should prevail. Indeed, in the Appendix it is shown that when the payroll tax is exogenous
then two steady state equilibria arise. Moreover, unemployment is reduced in the optimistic equilibrium and
increased in the pessimistic equilibrium if there is a shift of the tax incidence from wage taxes to payroll taxes.
The main di¤erence with respect to the gross Bismarckian system is that the pessimistic equilibria may be
unstable. In fact, numerical simulations suggest that the pessimistic equilibria may be either stable (with or
without cycles) or unstable. We observe that when b is su¢ ciently low then the pessimistic equilibrum is stable
without cycles. However, when we increase b then the pessimistic equilibrium rst becomes stable with cycles
and after unstable.
4.4 Alternative bargaining patterns
Bargaining over wage and employment. We have considered that the negotiation is a right-to-manage
one. A di¤erent situation arises when the unions bargain on both the wage and the employment level.18 In this
case, after the capital level has been selected by the rm, and according to the Nash solution, the wage and the
employment level solve
max
fLt;wtg
[(wt(1   t)  wt)Lt]

AK1 t L

t   wtLt(1 +  t)
1 
;
from where the following optimal conditions are satised:
wt (1 +  t) = (1   t)AK1 t L 1t ; (49)
wtLt(1 +  t) = AK
1 
t L

t + (1  )wt (1 +  t)Lt= (1   t) : (50)
Substituting for the payroll tax from equation (49) into equation (50) we obtain
wt (1   t) = Qwt: (51)
18This model is usually called the e¢ cient bargaining model. However, since in our model there is a previous decision on capital
that is not considered in the bargaining, we do not use this term in order to avoid any confusion about e¢ ciency.
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And using equations (6) and (51) we get the employment as a function of the wage tax,
Lt =
1   t   tQ
Q (1   t   t)
: (52)
Note that this is the same condition as that in the right-to-manage model and, thus, the same results apply.
Seigniorage. In the seigniorage model, employment is not considered by unions, who only focus on wages
(see, for instance, Oswald, 1985). Then, rms and unions bargain over wages and the rm has the right-to-
manage. While both the government budget constraint and the disagreement point are the same as in section
3, the optimal condition from the Nash problem is now slightly di¤erent. Combining such condition with the
right-to-manage condition (4) yields
wit(1   t) = bQwit; (53)
where bQ =  (1  ) = (  ) > 1. Hence, all the results of section 3 remain qualitatively unchanged.
Corporatist institutions. The analysis of this paper assumes a decentralized negotiation. Thus, both
unions and rms bargain at the rm level without taking into account the indirect e¤ects that their decisions have
on the unemployment benet system. In contrast, in a corporatist economy or an economy with a centralized
negotiation, unions and rms would have into account this indirect e¤ect and, as a result, unemployment would
be lower. Moreover, the existence of hysteresis would disappear, since expectations would be coordinated among
the agents.
5 Final Remarks
We have shown that the composition of labor taxes specically used to nance an unemployment benet sys-
tem has an important e¤ect on the unemployment rate in an unionized economy with capital accumulation.
Moreover, we have shown when an unemployment benet budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have in-
determinacy in the sense that multiple self-fullling equilibria may arise. In particular, when the unemployment
benet system is gross Bismarckian, then the tax wedge determines the unemployment rate of the economy.
Moreover, the lower the wage tax is, the lower the unemployment rate is. When the unemployment benet
system is net Bismarckian, then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the unemployment benet
system is nanced. Hence, unemployment is exclusively explained by the technology, the unionsbargaining
power and the replacement ratio. When the unemployment benet system is Beveridgean, then the labor tax
composition does not a¤ect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the
employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We show that the qualitative results do not change if we change
the type of negotiation between unions and rms.
In the analysis, we have assumed that individuals save a constant fraction of their income. This assumption is
not innocuous. With this type of savings, if the unemployment benet system was nanced exclusively through
taxes on capital income, then the unemployment benet system would be neutral for the unemployment. This
informs us that a deeper insight should be made.
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Appendix: The mixed unemployment benet system
The right-to-manage and the wage conditions arising form the Nash bargaining are identical to those of
section 2, given by equations (4) and (5), respectively. But the government budget constraint and the unions
disagreement point di¤er. When benets consist both on a xed part bt and a variable part wich is a proportion
of the wage twt, the government budget constraint becomes
wtLt( t +  t) = (1  Lt) (twt + bt) ; (A.1)
while the disagreement point of the unions is
wt = wtLt(1   t) + (1  Lt) (twt + bt) : (A.2)
Note that unemployed do not pay taxes. Combining equations (5), (A.1) and (A.2), and after (17) yields
(1   t) = Q (1 +  t)

Kt+1
sAK1 t
 1

. (A.3)
And from equations (4) and (A.1), and after (17) we have
Kt+1( t +  t) =

s  s 1 A  1K 1t+1K
 1

t

ts
1 
 A
1
K
 1

t+1 K
1 

t + bt (1 +  t)

: (A.4)
We consider the case where the instrument used to adjust the government budget is the wage tax. Hence,
substituting for  t from equation (A.3) into equation (A.4), we have the dynamics of the economy,
Kt+1

1 +
t
1 +  t

 Qs  1A  1K
1+

t+1 K
 1

t  
t
1 +  t
s
1
A
1
K
 1

t+1 K
1 

t +s
 1
 A 
1
K
1

t+1K
 1

t bt sbt = 0;
(A.5)
from where the steady state equilibrium solves
Qs 
1
A 
1
K2  



1 +

1 +  

+ s
 1
 A 
1
 b

K +


1 +  
s
1
A
1
 + sb

= 0: (A.6)
Note that in a Beveridgean system,  = 0; taxes do not a¤ect capital and, thus, unemployment. Instead, in a
mixed unemployment benet system we always have two equilibria, one pessimistic K1 and the other optimistic
K2, with K1 < K2. Using equations (A.1) and (4) we get
Lt =
tA (sA)
1 
 + bt (1 +  t)
A (sA)
1 
 ( t +  t + t) + bt (1 +  t)
; (A.7)
which combined with equations (17) and (A.3) yield a continuum of equilibrium pairs ( t;  t) which are implicitly
dened by
tA (sA)
1 
 + bt (1 +  t)
A (sA)
1 
 ( t +  t + t) + bt (1 +  t)
=
1   t
Q (1 +  t)
: (A.8)
In contrast with the gross Bismarckian unemployment benet system, since bt > 0 then for each wage tax we
have that two di¤erent values of the payroll tax can arise. Hence, two equilibria are attained regardless of the
tax used to adjust the government budget.
Next, we analyze the stability properties of the equilibria. Implicit di¤erentiation of equation (A.5) and,
after, evaluating in steady state yields
dKt+1
dKt
=
H   H
H   M ; (A.9)
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where
H = Qs 
1
A 
1
K2   s 1 A  1 bK   
1 +  
s
1
A
1
 ; (A.10)
and
M =  Qs  1A  1K2 + 

1 +

1 +  

K   
1 +  
s
1
A
1
 : (A.11)
From equation (A.6) we have that M = sb   s 1 A  1 bK, which is positive.19 Su¢ cient conditions for the
equilibria to be stable without cycles are that either H  0; or H > 0 and H > M: A su¢ cient condition for
the equilibria to be stable with cycles is that H > 0 and H < M=(2  ). Using equations (A.6), (A.10) and
(A.11) we have that
H  M = 2Qs  1A  1K2  

s
 1
 A 
1
 b+ 

1 +

1 +  

K; (A.12)
which is positive at the optimistic equilibrium and negative at the pessimistic one. 20 Hence, the optimistic
equilibrium is always stable, since H > M > 0. In the pessimistic equilibrium we have that H  M < 0. Thus,
in order to have stability it must be the case that either H < 0; or H > 0 and (2   )H < M . These last
two conditions can be reduced to (2  )H   M < 0: Note that if b = 0 then this condition is satised, since
M = 0 and H < M . However, for high values of b the stability properties of the pessimistic equilibria change.
We can dene a subspace of the parameter space   <6 such that if the vector  = (; ; s; b; ;  ) belongs to
the subspace ; then the pessimistic equilibrium is locally stable, and it is unstable otherwise. As an example,
we show in Table 1 some numerical results (the subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the pessimistic and the optimistic
equilibrium, respectively).21 Note that the last four rows are the beveridgean benet system when v = 0: Also
note that in the case of b = 0:45 and  = 0:55 the wage taxes for the pessimistic equilibrium are increasing with
 :
In order to show the e¤ects of a change in the labor tax composition, rst we need to solve equation (A.6),
K =


1 + 1+ 

+ s
 1
 A 
1
 b
rh


1 + 1+ 

+ s
 1
 A 
1
 b
i2
  4Qs  1A  1


1+ s
1
A
1
 + sb

2Qs 
1
A 
1

:
(A.13)
The equilibria exist if the term into the root is positive, which we assume. Di¤erentiating K with respect to  
gives dK=d = (dK=dB)(dB=d ); where B = = (1 +  ) and therefore sign (dB=d ) < 0: Hence,
sign

dK
d 

=  sign

dK
dB

=  sign

C 



1 +

1 +  

+ s
 1
 A 
1
 b  2Q

; (A.14)
where C is the root of equation (A.13). Substituting C from equation (A.13) into (A.14) for each equilibrium
and noting from equation (17) that Ks 
1
A 
1
 = L < 1 for both equilibria, we have that sign (dK1=d ) < 0
and sign (dK2=d ) > 0:
19Note that sb  s 1 A  1 bK = sb

1  s  1A  1K

> 0 since in steady state s 
1
A 
1
K = L < 1.
20Since equation (A.6) is quadratic, then by di¤erentiating equation (A.6) and multiplying the resulting expression by K gives
directly the sign of (A.12) for each equilibrium.
21We have chosen the following values for the parameters: A = 4; s = 0:1;  = 0:02 and  = 0:66: Also, in this numerical example
we have included some cases where the pessimistic equilibrium is unstable, i.e. (2  )H1   M1 > 0, in a larger proportion than
the observed in other simulations, where these cases are unusual. Also, the cases where the pessimistic equilibrium is stable with
cycles, i.e. H1 > 0, appear in other simulations in a smaller proportion than the suggested in this table.
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b  (%)  L1 L2 w 1(%) 2(%) H1 (2  )H1   M1
0:4 1 0:55 0:829 0:940 1:63 15:4 4:0  
0:4 2 0:55 0:820 0:943 1:61 15:2 2:8  
0:4 3 0:55 0:813 0:945 1:60 15:3 1:6  
0:4 4 0:55 0:806 0:947 1:58 15:2 0:4  
0:45 1:5 0:55 0:886 0:910 1:62 9:1 6:6 +  
0:45 2 0:55 0:876 0:917 1:61 9:6 5:4  
0:45 3 0:55 0:863 0:925 1:60 10:1 3:7  
0:45 4 0:55 0:853 0:930 1:58 10:3 2:2  
0:45 5 0:55 0:844 0:934 1:57 10:4 0:8  
0:55 4 0:5 0:884 0:911 1:58 7:0 4:2 +  
0:55 5 0:5 0:870 0:921 1:57 7:6 2:2  
0:55 6 0:5 0:860 0:927 1:55 7:8 0:7  
0:77 1 0:35 0:882 0:913 1:63 9:9 6:7 + +
0:77 2 0:35 0:871 0:920 1:61 10:1 5:1 +  
0:77 3 0:35 0:863 0:925 1:60 10:1 3:7 +  
0:77 4 0:35 0:857 0:928 1:58 9:9 2:4 +  
0:77 5 0:35 1:57 0:851 0:931 9:7 1:1 +  
0:85 1 0:3 1:63 0:879 0:915 10:3 6:5 +  
0:85 2 0:3 1:61 0:870 0:921 10:2 5:0 +  
0:85 4 0:3 1:58 0:858 0:928 9:8 2:4 +  
0:85 6 0:3 1:55 0:848 0:932 9:1 0:08 +  
1 1 0:2 0:859 0:927 1:63 12:3 5:3 +  
1 3 0:2 0:851 0:931 1:60 11:3 3:1 +  
1 5 0:2 0:845 0:934 1:57 10:3 0:9 +  
1:3 1 0 0:832 0:939 1:63 15:1 4:1 +  
1:3 3 0 0:832 0:939 1:60 13:4 2:2 +  
1:33 1 0 0:864 0:924 1:63 11:8 5:6 + +
1:33 3 0 0:864 0:924 1:60 10:0 3:7 + +
Table 1. Stability properties of the equilibria and taxes.
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